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Abstract
This paper explores the existence and endogeneity of gender di¤er-
ences in strategic behaviour. We report results from two experimental
studies employing the beauty contest game, one in the laboratory and
one in the classroom. We observe robust and signicant gender dif-
ferences in observed depth of strategic reasoning in favour of men in
zero-stake situations. These di¤erences disappear when a monetary
prize is awarded. We also nd that females engage in more rounds of
reasoning than males when gender and stereotypes are made salient.
This e¤ect of priming is driven by females who believe women are su-
perior in the game.
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The experimental literature has established the existence of strong indi-
vidual heterogeneity in strategic sophistication. Observed individual behav-
iour departs drastically from the predictions derived under the assumption
of publicly-known unbounded cognitive capabilities (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and
Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Bosch-Domenech
et al., 2002). This heterogeneity reects di¤erences in the extent to which
individuals engage in mentalising processes or "theory of mind," that is,
the activity of thinking about others thoughts, emotions and intentions
(Baron-Cohen, 1991). Models of level-k thinking have tried to account for
these di¤erences by acknowledging that individuals vary in their cognitive
level and have non-equilibrium beliefs about the sophistication of others.1
However, these models remain silent on the extent to which the dis-
tribution of observed strategic sophistication represents an underlying dis-
tribution of ability. Observed depth of strategic reasoning is likely to be
endogenous to beliefs about the sophistication of others and the incentives
provided. An individual may be willing to engage in additional mentalising
e¤ort if he/she perceives the rest of players to be relatively sophisticated.
On the other hand, a person may be reluctant to engage in further levels of
reasoning if stakes are low. Behaviour in those cases would be a reection
of the motivation of individuals to engage in the reasoning process as much
as of their cognitive ability.2
1Level-k models of thinking were introduced by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson
(1994, 1995). Later, Camerer et al. (2004) proposed the cognitive hierarchy model. Both
models are anchored on the existence of non-strategic individuals, labelled level-0, but
di¤er on how individuals respond to the presence of less sophisticated ones. See Crawford
et al. (2013) for a survey and Strzalecki (2014) for a recent development in this literature.
2See Choi (2012) and Alaoui and Penta (2016) for recent attempts to develop theoretical
models accounting for the endogeneity of strategic sophistication.
2
In this paper, we experimentally study the heterogeneity and endogene-
ity of strategic sophistication in the context of gender. We analyse the
existence of gender di¤erences in observed depth of reasoning, beliefs and in
the sensitivity to nancial incentives and gender priming in games. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the rst ones to do so.
The rst question we address is whether there exist gender di¤erences
in depth of strategic reasoning. In the psychology literature, superior men-
talising ability is typically ascribed to women (Baron-Cohen, 2002). But no
study has explored whether this perceived superiority a¤ects behaviour. The
second question is whether such gender di¤erences (if any) are mediated by
beliefs about the relative strategic sophistication of men and women. Gender
stereotypes a¤ect daily behaviour in a pervasive manner. Perceptions about
the gender-bias of tasks have been shown to have an impact on gender di¤er-
ences in performance (Guenther et al., 2010; Shurchkov; 2012). There is also
evidence showing that stereotypes about mens superiority in maths produce
gender di¤erences in test performance when gender is primed (Danaher and
Crandall, 2008; Nguyen and Ryan, 2008). Therefore, stereotypes might also
inuence strategic behaviour. We investigate whether gender salience and
changes in the gender composition of the group of players alter their ob-
served depth of reasoning. Our third question relates to the endogeneity
of depth of reasoning to monetary incentives. Higher monetary incentives
are likely to induce deeper strategic reasoning. But monetary stakes, or the
absence of them, might also frame the interaction in a di¤erent light for men
and women, intensify or crowd out intrinsic motivation, and create gender
di¤erences in strategic behaviour.
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We explore these questions by means of a laboratory experiment where
we manipulate nancial incentives, gender priming and the gender compo-
sition of the set of participants. The design employs the p-beauty contest
(Nagel, 1995). This game is well suited for our purposes for three reasons.
First, incentives are easy to adjust by changing its monetary value. Second,
beliefs about the relative sophistication of opponents are extremely impor-
tant. The guessing game involves a calculation task. Gender priming may
trigger negative stereotypes about womens mathematical skills. Because it
is a strategic interaction, it may also activate beliefs about femalesadvan-
tage in mentalising. Finally, it is a competitive game; players must outguess
others in order to win a prize. The literature (see below) has shown that the
perceived gender-bias of a task a¤ects the performance of men and women
in competitions; gender priming can activate such perceptions.
Participants rst play several non-incentivised rounds of the guessing
game with di¤erent values of p and no feedback. One of them is the stan-
dard 23 -beauty contest. In the control treatment, subjects then play an
incentivised round of the 23 -beauty contest. In the Priming treatment, gen-
der and stereotypes about the relative ability of males and females in the
game are made salient. So after the non-incentivised phase, subjects play
two incentivised rounds of the guessing game, one in a mixed gender group
and another in a same gender group. The comparison between the incen-
tivised and the non-incentivised rounds of the control treatment allow us
to study the existence of gender di¤erences in depth of strategic reasoning.
The comparison between the primed and the gender-neutral incentivised
rounds, and between mixed gender and same gender rounds allows us to
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study whether stereotypes about the relative strategic sophistication of men
and women a¤ect behaviour.
We nd that females display less depth of reasoning than males when
monetary incentives are absent. No gender di¤erences exist when a monetary
prize is at stake in the control treatment. Gender di¤erences re-emerge but
in the opposite direction in the Priming treatment. Females perform more
rounds of reasoning than males. Changes in gender composition only a¤ect
a subset of males who play according to more rounds of reasoning when
playing in mixed gender groups compared to single gender groups.
We explore the reasons behind the e¤ect of priming and changes in gen-
der composition by analysing the responses to a questionnaire administered
to participants and non-participants of similar characteristics. We nd that
beliefs about which gender is better in the game have a signicant e¤ect on
behaviour. Males who believe females are superior display less depth of rea-
soning than those who believe the opposite. This di¤erence is in line with the
concept of stereotype threat (Steele, 1997) by which members of negatively
stereotyped groups perform worse in fear of conrming the stereotype. On
the other hand, our gender manipulation has the e¤ect of inducing women
who believe females are better in the game to perform further rounds of
strategic reasoning. We conclude that this positive e¤ect of gender priming
on the observed depth of reasoning of womenis due to females perceiving
themselves as superior in the game.
This study does not allow us however to analyse the e¤ect of the intro-
duction of nancial incentives on the observed depth of reasoning because
its within-subject design can induce feedback-free learning (Weber, 2003).
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This is important because monetary incentives can constitute a contextual
cue and frame the interaction in a di¤erent light. We report results from
a second experiment run on rst-responses. Students in di¤erent cohorts
played the beauty contest with and without a monetary prize. We nd that
female subjects play according to less rounds of reasoning than males under
zero-stakes. No gender di¤erences exist when a monetary prize is awarded.
These results coincide with those we obtained in the laboratory study. In
addition, we observe a signicant increase in the rounds of strategic reason-
ing of females when monetary incentives are present. Males do not react
signicantly to the presence of a monetary reward.
The rests of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 reviews the related
literature. Sections 3 presents the design and results of our laboratory ex-
periment. We analyse the responses to questionnaires and the results of the
classroom experiment in Section 3. In Section 4, we conclude and discuss
further the relevance of our results.
1 Related Literature
Very few experimental studies report gender di¤erences in strategic behav-
iour. Camerer et al. (2004) show results from a beauty contest game in single
sex groups in their Table 2, but they only report summary statistics. Burn-
ham et al. (2009) nd no gender di¤erences in choices in the beauty contest.
This is consistent with our results when gender is not primed and there
are monetary incentives. Östling et al. (2011) and Arad and Rubinstein
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(2012)3 report that females display slightly lower strategic sophistication in
the Lowest Unique Positive Integer (LUPI) game and in the Colonel Blotto
games respectively. The main goal of these studies was not to investigate
the existence of gender di¤erences in strategic sophistication.
Several studies have explored the existence of other types of individual
di¤erences in the beauty contest. Burnham et al. (2009) and Gill and Prowse
(2015) show that there is a signicant correlation between higher cognitive
ability and lower entries. behaviour in the beauty contest is similar across
subject pools, although some di¤erences exist; portfolio managers and game
theorists display higher strategic sophistication (Bosch-Domenech, et al.,
2002; Camerer et al., 2004). Kovalchik et al. (2005) nd that older adults
play similarly to young adults and Bühren and Bjorn (2010) nd that chess
grandmasters do not play di¤erently than lay people.
A number of studies have found that strategic behaviour responds strongly
to the perceived sophistication of opponents. Palacios-Huerta and Volij
(2009) nd that when students play the centipede game against professional
chess players they engage in more rounds of backward induction.4 Agra-
nov et al. (2012) nd that undergraduate students seem to perform further
rounds of reasoning when playing the guessing game against graduate stu-
dents than against computers. Georganas et al. (2015) nd a similar result
in the undercutting game. Our results conrm these ndings.
We are aware of only one experimental study relating strategic sophis-
tication to nancial incentives. Alaoui and Penta (2016) nd that subjects
3Personal communication with the authors.
4This is not contemplated by models of level-k thinking since agents in these models
do not factor the presence of individuals more sophisticated than them.
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engage in more rounds of reasoning when the prize from outguessing the
opponent increases.5 However, these authors do not explore gender dif-
ferences in the response to higher stakes. Fryer et al. (2008) nd that
the performance of males in a GRE-style mathematical test increases rel-
ative to the performance of females when a payment per correct answer is
introduced. This is in contrast with our ndings, but might be due to the
strategic nature of our experiment. Azmat et al. (2016) nd that the gender
performance-gap in lower-stake tests in favor of female students diminishes
as test-stakes increase. In line with our ndings, Frick (2011) employs data
from professional distance running competitions and nds that di¤erences
in the competitiveness of female and male races are signicantly smaller in
races where higher prizes or more prestige is at stake. Similarly, Petrie and
Segal (2015) observe that the gender gap in tournament entry vanishes when
prizes become su¢ ciently large.
By using a competitive game, in which the player who best guesses the
average response wins, our paper also relates to the literature on gender
di¤erences in competitive performance. Gneezy et al. (2003) and Gneezy
and Rustichini (2004) have shown that females underperform in competitive
environments. Guenther et al. (2010) nd that competitive performance
depends on the perceived bias of the task; females perform better than males
when the task is perceived as female-biased. Along similar lines, Shurchkov
(2012) nd that females overtake men in competitions involving a verbal
task and low-time pressure. Regarding the e¤ect of gender priming, Iriberri
5Arad and Rubinstein (2012) run a treatment where they manipulate payo¤s so that
further levels of reasoning have no monetary cost. They nd that nevertheless subjects
very rarely perform more than three rounds of reasoning.
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and Rey-Biel (2016) show that omitting information about the gender of the
opponent helps to mitigate the underperformance of women in competition.
In contrast, we nd that gender priming induces females to engage in further
rounds of reasoning and to outperform males.
2 Beauty in the Lab
2.1 Design
Our experimental study was conducted with four di¤erent cohorts of under-
graduate students at the University of Barcelona between 2012 and 2015.
We made no mention to gender during the recruitment process.6 A total of
240 subjects participated in the study. This sample was quite homogeneous.
Virtually all subjects were Spanish and all of them majored in the School of
Economics and Business. They were rst year students in order to ensure
they had no previous knowledge of game theory. Because of this limitation,
we could only run at most two sessions per academic year.
All participants played in gender-balanced groups of 24 subjects. Sub-
jects could see each other but were seated at a considerable distance so they
could not communicate. This was intended because we wanted subjects to
see the gender composition of the group. The experiment was implemented
with pen and paper. No feedback was provided during the session, only
at the end. Experimenters answered privately any questions subjects had.
The sessions lasted between 40 and 50 minutes. There were always two in-
6For showing up, subjects received three euros
.
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structors in each room. Their gender matched the gender composition of
participants in the room in order to minimise experimenter demand e¤ects.
At the end of each session, participants lled up a short questionnaire aimed
to elicit their views about the behaviour and the relative strategic sophisti-
cation of males and females in the game and their. We analyse the responses
to this questionnaire in Section 3.1.
Each session was divided in two phases. The rst phase was common
to all sessions and treatments. In this phase, there were no monetary in-
centives and gender was never referred to or made salient. Subjects were
asked to guess a fraction p of the average response in their room. They
played nine rounds of this guessing game with di¤erent values of p in each
round. The values were p =
 
1; 23 ;
11
10 ;
1
3 ;
3
2 ;
1
5 ;
6
5 ;
1
2 ;
4
3

. Instructions were pro-
vided through white paper booklets where participants also had to record
their answers. The experimenters read the instructions aloud to facilitate
comprehension. Subjects did not write neither their name nor their gender
in these booklets. Each participant was assigned a number that served as
their unique identier. The purpose of this rst phase was to help subjects
to familiarise with the beauty contest.
In the second phase, we introduced nancial incentives and adminis-
tered two treatments, the Priming treatment (n=144) and the No priming
treatment (n=96). In the No priming treatment, participants had to guess
two-thirds of the average response in their room. The winner got a prize
of 40 euros (around £ 32); the prize was divided if there was more than one
winner. Participants had to provide their answer in a white paper sheet.
In the Priming treatment, subjects played two independent rounds where
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they had to guess two-thirds of the average response in their room. The dif-
ference between the two rounds was the gender composition of the group,
single gender (SG) or mixed (balanced) gender (MG). These sessions were
run in two rooms located in two di¤erent corridors. Hence, at the beginning
of the second phase, there were two gender-balanced groups of 24 partici-
pants in each room. We then simultaneously moved either all the male or
female students in each room from one room to the other using di¤erent
corridors so the two groups could not see each other. We combined these
movements of participants in such a way that di¤erent sessions alternated
the order of the SG and MG rounds. When moving from one room to the
other, participants were guided by an instructor of their same gender who
made all e¤orts to prevent any communication among them. All participants
changed room at some point of the session. To help the reader, we provide
a graphical representation of these movements in Figure A1 of Appendix A.
In addition to this manipulation, we primed gender by distributing pink
booklets to female subjects and blue booklets to male subjects. In the MG
round, there was one female and one male instructor in each room. The gen-
der of the two instructors in the room coincided with the gender of the group
in the SG round. Payo¤s in the Priming treatment were determined by se-
lecting randomly one of the two rounds of the second phase. Consequently,
there were two prizes of 40 euros each, one per room.
Throughout the paper, we will associate lower entries when p < 1 to
further rounds of reasoning, but we will be careful not to associate lower re-
sponses with more sophisticated strategic reasoning. The latter association
is supported by some studies: Subjects who choose lower entries have better
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scores in the Cognitive Reection Test (Burnham et al., 2009; Brañas-Garza
et al., 2012) and display more activation in areas of the brain associated with
theory of mind (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009). But it would be ultimately wrong
to infer higher strategic sophistication from lower responses directly. This
is because strategic sophistication is a function of both depth of reasoning
and beliefs about the sophistication of the opponents. It would be incorrect
to label as sophisticated a player who chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy
when the rest of players are relatively unsophisticated compared to another
player who departs from the game theoretical prediction but takes correctly
into account the strategic sophistication of the rest of players. To better ex-
plore this association, we use the quadratic distance to the winning response
as a measure of strategic sophistication in the online Appendix, and show
that our main results go through.
2.2 Hypotheses
As outlined in the introduction, our experimental design aims to study the
heterogeneity and endogeneity of strategic reasoning by changing nancial
incentives and priming stereotypes about the strategic sophistication of men
and women. Since we are the rst ones to address these issues directly, we
cannot draw strong hypotheses from previous evidence.
The results in Burnham et al. (2009) suggest that we should expect
no gender di¤erences in behaviour in the incentivised gender-neutral round.
Regarding gender priming, the recent theoretical model by Alaoui and Penta
(2016) and the experimental evidence in Agranov et al. (2012) suggest
that players should play according to more (less) rounds of reasoning when
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they perceive they are playing against more (less) sophisticated opponents.
Hence, we expect the e¤ect of making gender salient and of changing the
gender composition of the group to depend on players beliefs about the
relative ability of men and women in the game. On the one hand, the
beauty contest involves a relatively complex calculation task: subjects must
think what might be the average response, and then multiply the result by
the announced factor one or more times. This calculation may trigger gender
stereotypes related to the mathematical abilities of females.7 ;8 On the other
hand, the game could be perceived as female-biased because it is a strategic
interaction and there is a well-known stereotype of women being better at
knowing what others feel and think. Admittedly, because these two e¤ects
may be present, our design does not allow us to isolate one from the other.
For the analysis by round we will employ the Mann-Whitney and the
Median tests because we will be comparing responses by gender. When
comparing treatments, we will employ the Wilcoxon signed-ranked and the
Sign tests because observations are not independent. We must use non
parametric tests because responses are not normally distributed in any of
the treatments or rounds.
7Krendl et al. (2008) show that brain areas involved in calculation are less active in
females when this stereotype is activated. Some of these areas are also relevant for subjects
playing the beauty contest (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009).
8The existence of gender di¤erences in math performance is still a much debated issue.
To have an e¤ect on behavior, subjects only need to believe such stereotype to be true.
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2.3 Results within Rounds
2.3.1 First phase: no monetary incentives, no gender priming
Table 1 depicts the aggregate results for the round of the rst phase with
p = 23 . Recall that there were no monetary incentives and no gender priming
in this phase. The distribution of male responses has a lower mean and
median than the distribution of female entries.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 28.9 25 17.7
Females 32.1 30 20.5
Table 1: Aggregate Results by Gender in the No Monetary Incentives Round.
In addition, the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically
dominates the distribution of male responses. To test this, we employ the
test of stochastic dominance introduced by Davidson and Duclos (2000).9
This test allows us to associate stochastic dominance to a particular range
of entries and, hence, to a certain depth of reasoning. The Davidson-Duclos
test reports that gender di¤erence emerge in the interval between 42 and
50 (see rst column of Table A1 in Appendix A), which corresponds to less
rounds of reasoning. Figure 1 illustrates this result. We use blue and pink
for males and females respectively.
9This test compares distributions at pre-determined points. A distribution is said to
rst stochastically dominate another if for all comparison points for which di¤erences
between the two distributions are statistically signicant the sign of these di¤erences is
identical. We compared distributions at all points between 0 and 100. In Appendix A, we
report comparisons at a number of point responses.
14
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 fr
eq
.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Response
Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions by Gender in the First Phase, p=2/3.
This dominance result holds for all rounds of the rst phase. The distri-
bution of femalesresponses rst order stochastically dominates the one of
males in all rounds with p < 1 and the reverse holds in all rounds with p > 1
(see Figure A1 in Appendix A). Gender di¤erences remain very strong even
in the last round of this rst phase, the one with p = 43 ; and in the round
with p = 12 ; the last round subjects played with p < 1: In that round, again,
the distribution of female responses rst order stochastically dominates the
one for males (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0:049).10 Hence any feedback-free
learning (Weber, 2003) that might take place across rounds does not seem
to reduce gender di¤erences in behaviour.
To highlight further these strong gender di¤erences, we classify subjects
according to their observed depth of reasoning across the rst phase: For each
p 6= 1, we assign the level k = f1; 2; 3;1g to individual response xi when
10This test is based on the signicance of the largest positive di¤erence between two
CDFs. The outcome of the test is that distribution g rst order stochastically dominates
f if the largest positive di¤erence of f over g is signicant but not the one of g over f:
We report the p-value of the largest positive di¤erence in CDFs in favor of the dominated
distribution, which in this case is the distribution of responses of male participants.
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k minimises d =
 
xi   50pk
2
. We follow Coricelli and Nagel (2009) and
classify a response as a low level response if k = 1 (high level otherwise). A
subjects type is considered to be low (high) type if at least ve out of her/his
eight responses are of low (high) level. The rest of subjects are considered
random and discarded from the analysis. This classication reects how
close an individual plays with respect to the equilibrium prediction. It partly
incorporates beliefs about the sophistication of the opponent: Coricelli and
Nagel (2009) show that high type subjects display a more intense activation
in areas of the brain associated with theory of mind than low type subjects.11
As Table 2 shows, 80.7 % of the classied individuals in the sample are
low type; from these, 58.9% are female. The percentages of high and low
type subjects out of the whole subject pool (19.2% and 80.7% respectively)
are similar to the ones obtained in previous studies.12 However, these gures
mask important gender di¤erences. The small fraction of high type females
(9.2%) stands out. It is signicantly di¤erent from the proportion of high
type males (Proportions test, p < 0:001).
Low High Total
Males 69 30 99
Females 99 10 109
Total 168 40 208
Table 2: Type Classication by Gender (First Phase).
11For the rounds with p > 1; we take the equilibrium where all responses are 100 as the
focal one and classify the sophistication of responses accordingly.
12Coricelli and Nagel (2009) obtain 41% and 59% respectively (n=20). Brañas-Garza
et al. (2012) obtain 22% and 78% (n=191).
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These gender di¤erences suggest that non-monetary incentives are at
stake in these rounds. One non-monetary prize could be the utility of win-
ning. In contests, Sheremeta (2010) nds that about a third of subjects are
willing to spend a positive amount of money in order to win a zero value
prize. Males might value winning the guessing game more highly than fe-
males, leading them to engage in more rounds of reasoning. We explore this
issue further when we present our second experimental study in Section 3.2.
2.3.2 Second phase: monetary incentives and no gender priming
Now we move to the second phase of the experimental session, where we
introduced monetary incentives. Recall that in this phase we applied two
treatments: a control treatment (No priming treatment) and another in
which we made gender, and therefore stereotypes, salient (Priming treat-
ment).
In the control treatment, the gender composition of the group was always
balanced. Table 3 shows that the distribution of responses of females has a
larger mean and median than the one of males.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 23.2 17 18.8
Females 29.2 24.5 21.3
Table 3: Aggregate Results by Gender in the No Priming Treatment.
Males seem to play according to more rounds of reasoning than females in
the No priming treatment. However, the distributions of males and females
responses in this treatment are not statistically di¤erent (Mann-Whitney,
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p = 0:128; Median test, p = 0:153). Furthermore, both the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and the Davidson-Duclos tests cannot rank these distributions in
terms of rst order stochastic dominance (see second column of Table A1 in
Appendix A). This result is in line with Burnham et al. (2009) who nd no
signicant gender di¤erences in entries in the beauty contest when monetary
incentives are provided.
Let us summarise our ndings so far in the following result:
Result 1 Male subjects choose lower responses than females when there are
no monetary incentives. Gender di¤erences are not signicant when
monetary incentives are present.
2.3.3 Gender priming
As mentioned above, we primed gender by manipulating the gender compo-
sition of the group and the colour of the instruction booklets. This manipu-
lation was expected to trigger simultaneously stereotypes about the relative
mathematical and mentalising ability of males and females. We next study
gender di¤erences in observed depth of reasoning when gender is salient and
the gender composition of the group changes.
The MG round Recall, that in the MG round of the Priming treatment,
half of the participants in each room were male and half were female. The
di¤erence between the second phase of the No priming treatment and the
MG round is that gender was made salient in the latter. Table 4 shows that
the distribution of responses of females in the MG round has a lower mean
and median than those of males.
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Mean Median Std dev
Males 27.4 25 18.3
Females 21.4 19 17.7
Table 4: Aggregate Results by Gender in the Priming MG Round.
Females display deeper strategic reasoning than males in this round. The
distributions of responses across genders in the MG round are statistically
di¤erent (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:021; Median test, p = 0:009). Furthermore,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = 0:011) and the Davidson-Duclos (see third
column of Table A1 in Appendix A) tests provide a clear ordering between
them, as Figure 2 illustrates. More specically, the Davidson-Duclos domi-
nance test establishes that there is a higher number of females than males
who choose entries in the interval between 12 and 24.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 fr
eq
.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Response
Figure 2: Cumulative Distributions of Responses by Gender in the MG
Round.
The SG round In this round of the Priming treatment, participants
played against opponents of their same gender. Table 5 shows the mean and
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median responses for males and females. Again, the average and median
male response are higher than the average and median female responses.
Mean Median Std dev
Males 29.9 26 20.9
Females 20.7 17 14.9
Table 5: Aggregate results by gender in the Priming SG round.
The distributions of responses across genders are statistically di¤erent
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:009; Median test, p = 0:017) and the dominance
result is even stronger than in the MG round, as Figure 3 illustrates (see
fourth column of Table A1 in Appendix A for the result of the Davidson-
Duclos test).
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of Responses by Gender in the SG
Round.
Let us summarise our ndings pertaining to the gender-primed rounds
in the following result:
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Result 2 When gender is primed and there are monetary incentives, fe-
males play according to more rounds of reasoning than males.
2.4 Results across Rounds
2.4.1 Priming versus no priming
Let us now compare individual responses, rst across the gender-balanced
rounds of the Priming and No priming treatments, and then across the MG
and SG rounds of the Priming treatment.
We expected gender priming to make beliefs about the relative strategic
sophistication of males and females salient. If that were the case, responses
across the two treatments should change. But how? If there is the stereo-
type that one gender is inferior to the other in the game, members of that
gender may feel stereotype threat (Steele, 1997), and become anxious about
their performance. This might be the case for females if they perceive that
the mathematical calculation involved in the guessing game favors males
(Quinn and Spencer, 2001), or for males if they believe women are superior
in mentalising or in strategic interactions in general. Stereotype threat has
been consistently associated with higher emotional loads and cognitive im-
pairment (e.g. Schmader and Johns, 2003; Croizet et al., 2004; Krendl et al.,
2008). Hence, we would expect the threatened group to choose higher entries
in the Priming treatment than in the No priming treatment. Individuals
can also enjoy stereotype lift (Walton and Cohen, 2003) when they belong
to the group they believe is superior in the task. If there is the stereotype
that one gender is superior to the other, we would expect members of that
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group to choose lower entries in the Priming treatment compared to the No
priming one.
Table 6 below compares responses by gender and across the gender-
balanced rounds of the Priming and the No priming treatments. We ob-
serve that females change their behaviour considerably when gender is made
salient. Their mean and median responses are much lower in the Priming
treatment. Men change their answers to a lesser extent and in the opposite
direction.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, Priming MG 27.4 25 18.3
Female, Priming MG 21.4 19 17.7
Male, No priming 23.2 17 18.8
Female, No priming 29.2 24.5 21.3
Table 6: Aggregate Results by Gender and across Gender-Balanced Gounds.
The distributions of responses in the two treatments di¤er only for fe-
males (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:034; Median test, p = 0:052). Di¤erences in
the distribution of males responses across treatments are weaker (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:138; Median test, p = 0:062). But the Davidson-Duclos test
can rank these distributions in terms of rst stochastic dominance (see table
A2 in Appendix A). As Figure 4 corroborates, fewer males choose entries
between 10 and 18 and fewer females choose entries between 20 and 24 and
between 32 and 42 under Priming. Let us summarise these ndings in the
following result.
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Result 3 Females display more depth of reasoning in the Priming treat-
ment than in the No priming treatment. The opposite holds for males.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distributions of Responses by Gender and Treatment
in the Gender-Balanced Rounds.
The beauty contest involves a computation task. Gender priming may
trigger negative stereotypes relating to the mathematical ability of females.
This could lead female participants to exert lower cognitive e¤ort and thus
to respond higher numbers in the Priming treatment than in the No priming
treatment. On the other hand, common wisdom is that women are better at
imagining what others think and feel. This is supported by studies reporting
female superiority in empathy and mentalising ability (Baron-Cohen, 2002;
Krach et al., 2009). Gender priming may trigger this stereotype and thus
encourage femalescognitive e¤ort. Result 3 suggests that the second force
is stronger, resulting in lower (higher) entries by female (male) participants
in the Priming treatment. We investigate this idea further in Section 3.1
when analysing subjectsbeliefs about the relative strategic sophistication
of men and women.
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2.4.2 MG versus SG
Let us now compare the SG and the MG rounds. Recall that in the second
phase of the Priming treatment we manipulated the gender composition of
the groups of participants. The purpose of this manipulation was to explore
the role of beliefs about the strategic sophistication of the opponents. In
line with the ndings in Agranov et al. (2012) and the model by Alaoui and
Penta (2016), we conjectured that if an individual believes that a change
in the gender composition shifts up (down) the distribution of levels of so-
phistication in the group, he/she will exert more (less) cognitive e¤ort and
his/her entry will decrease (increase).
Table 7 shows that the average and median responses of both sexes do
not signicantly di¤er across the SG and the MG rounds.
Mean Median Std dev
Male, SG 29.9 26 20.9
Female, SG 20.7 17 14.9
Male, MG 27.4 25 18.3
Female, MG 21.4 19 17.7
Table 7: Aggregate Results by Gender across the SG and MG Rounds.
The distributions of males responses in the SG and MG rounds are
not statistically di¤erent (Wilcoxon sign-rank, p = 0:276; Sign-test, p =
0:427). The same result applies to femalesresponses (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:959; Sign-test p = 1:000).
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Figure 5: MalesResponses in the MG and SG Rounds.
A more detailed picture emerges from Figure 5, the scatterplot of males
entries in both rounds. Dispersion from the 45 degree line increases as
responses are higher, and is denser below the line. This suggests that a larger
number of male subjects decrease their response in the MG round compared
to the SG round than in the other way around. Statistical tests conrm this.
Male participants who in the SG round respond above the median decrease
their entries in the MG round (one tailed Sign-test, p = 0:040). There is
no signicant change for males who choose entries above the median in the
MG round. The lower responses in the MG round than in the SG round
are consistent with males increasing their depth of reasoning because they
perceive women to be superior in the game. It is also in line with Krach et
al. (2009), who in their fMRI study of the Prisoners dilemma observe men
compensating their weaker mentalising abilities. An alternative explanation
is that males may expect level-0 female players to randomise over lower
numbers than their male counterparts. In the next section, we explore these
two hypotheses by analysing the responses to the questionnaire administered
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at the end of each session.
Before that, let us summarise the results of the analysis across rounds:
1) Females react strongly to gender priming by engaging in more rounds
of reasoning whereas males react to a lesser extent and in the opposite
direction. And 2) males with higher responses in the SG round display
deeper strategic reasoning in the MG round.
3 Supplementary Analysis
In this Section, we analyse further the two dimensions studied above, namely,
the e¤ect of gender priming and the e¤ect of nancial incentives on strategic
behaviour. To do so, we rst study the answers to the questionnaire we
administered to participants. Second, we present results from a classroom
experiment which provides evidence on the existence of di¤erential responses
by gender to changes in monetary incentives.
3.1 Questionnaires
Participants in our laboratory study answered a questionnaire at the end of
the session but before any feedback was provided. The aim of this question-
naire was twofold: To investigate whether priming was e¤ective in activating
gender stereotypes and to explore whether beliefs about the relative strategic
sophistication of men and women inuenced behaviour.
We focus on two questions: "When p = 23 , which sex responds higher
numbers?" (Q1) and "Which sex is better at this game?" (Q2). We coded
the free-text answers into four options, "Males", "Females", "No di¤erence"
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and "Dont know." Q1 is designed to obtain information on beliefs about
the behaviour of others and Q2 is designed to elicit perceptions about the
relative sophistication of males and females. We have assumed, as it is cus-
tomary in the literature, that level-0 behaviour is uniformly distributed over
the set of strategies. But participants might have stereotypes on the ran-
dom behaviour of males and females which di¤er from that assumption.13
In addition, participants may have di¤erent views as to what it means to be
better in the game. This is ultimately irrelevant for our purposes because
the gender-bias subjects may perceive in the game (if any) can a¤ect their
behaviour regardless of whether such perception is correct or not. In any
case, responses to Q1 and Q2 display a medium to strong correlation (Con-
tingency coe¢ cient, 0:443; Cramérs V, 0:349), suggesting that participants
associated a better performance with lower responses.
Answers to Q1 were not incentivised. Whilst this might reduce their
validity, we show below that answers to that question have signicant ex-
planatory power. Admittedly, responses to both questions could be a¤ected
by the experiment itself. In order to have a cleaner source of information, we
also ran this questionnaire on a comparable population of students from the
University of Barcelona (n=134) who had not been exposed to the beauty
contest game before. This allows us to compare responses across three pop-
ulations, subjects who participated in the Priming treatment, those who
participated in the No priming treatment, and respondents who did not
participate in the experiment and had no knowledge of the game.
13A fraction of males responding to Q1 said that females tend to pick lower numbers
such as birthdays or lucky numbers. A similar fraction of females responded that males
tend to pick higher numbers because they like "speeding" and "big things in general."
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3.1.1 Was priming e¤ective?
We saw in previous sections that priming had an e¤ect on entries in the
beauty contest, especially for females. Women in the Priming treatment
chose lower entries than their counterparts in the No priming treatment.
We observed the opposite e¤ect, albeit weaker, for males. If priming was
indeed e¤ective in raising gender salience and stereotypes we should expect
it to have an e¤ect on responses to our questionnaire.
Figure 6: Responses by Gender to Q1 and Q2 (for Females) by Sample.
The left panel of Figure 6 shows the histogram of responses to Q1 by
subsample. The distribution of responses of participants who played in the
No priming treatment and those outside our subject pool are not signif-
icantly di¤erent. Responses are quite evenly distributed across the three
possible answers. However, participants in the Priming treatment are more
inclined to believe that the opposite sex tends to respond higher numbers.
The di¤erence with respect to the rest of answers to this question is statisti-
cally signicant (chi-squared; p = 0:020). Our gender priming thus induced
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participants to believe that there were gender di¤erences in entries in the
game. The right panel of Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of priming on responses
to Q2 of female participants only. Female subjects in the No priming treat-
ment tended to believe that either males are better at the game or that
there are no gender di¤erences, whereas female subjects in the Priming
treatment tend to believe the opposite. The di¤erence is weakly signicant
(chi-squared; p = 0:099). This pattern is in line with our previous result
showing that females display higher strategic sophistication when gender is
salient. Gender priming had no signicant e¤ect on malesresponses to Q2.
3.1.2 Gender bias
The next question is whether answers to the questionnaire can help explain
observed behaviour. The rst issue we tackle relates to the association be-
tween behaviour and beliefs about which gender is better in the guessing
game. Our aim is to study whether gender stereotypes, expressed in re-
sponses to Q2, might be related to observed depth of reasoning.
As the next result shows, this relationship is straightforward for males.
Result 4.1 The distribution of responses in the incentivised gender-balanced
rounds of males who believe that males are better is di¤erent from
the distribution of males who believe that females are better (Mann-
Whitney, p = 0:044).
The median response in the incentivised gender-balanced rounds for the
pooled sample of males who believe that females are better at the game is
25. It is 17 for males who believe that males are better at the game. The
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perceived gender-bias in the beauty contest is thus associated with depth
of strategic reasoning in males. It might be that men who believe that the
women have a relative advantage in the game choose lower entries because
they have lower cognitive abilities. It might also be that the causality is
reversed, and males who respond higher numbers conclude that their gender
is worse in the game (although there was no feedback until the very end of
the session). We will come back to this last point below when looking at
beliefs and gender composition.
Surprisingly, the data does not provide evidence on the existence of the
analogous association in females. Their behaviour in the incentivised gender-
balanced rounds is not related to their responses to Q2. However, a more
careful exploration shows that priming has a decisive e¤ect.
Result 4.2 Consider the subset of females who believe that females are
better in the game. The distribution of responses of participants in
the No priming treatment rst order stochastically dominates the one
of participants in the Priming treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p =
0:048).
This o¤ers an explanation for Result 2. The belief of women on their own
superiority in the game has an e¤ect on their behaviour only when gender
is made salient. The di¤erence in median responses is striking: 40 for those
women in the No priming treatment and 17 in the Priming treatment. It
is important to note that, in this case, we can pin down the causality from
perceptions to behaviour. It cannot be the case that behaviour a¤ected
their responses to Q2 because these are all women who believe that females
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are better in the game. So we can conclude that the combination of gen-
der salience and the belief that women are better in the game boosted the
observed depth of reasoning of these participants.
Interestingly, gender priming has no negative e¤ect on females who an-
swer that males are better in the game. This result might be due to the
presence of a generalised positive stereotype in favor of women which might
countervail their individual belief: In our out-sample survey, we asked an
additional question (Q3): "Which gender obtains better results in strategic
interactions?" A 42.5% of all respondents (57.5% for females) answered that
females obtain better results, and 34.3% answered that no di¤erence exists.
This might explain why females who answer that males are better in the
game do not display less strategic sophistication when gender is primed.
3.1.3 Gender composition
Let us now explore whether responses to the questionnaire can help us ex-
plain the changes we observed between the MG and the SG rounds of the
Priming treatment. Recall that we found that males who responded higher
numbers in the SG round decreased their entries in the MG round. First we
want to establish that, despite not being incentivised, responses to Q1 can
help to explain this change in behaviour across rounds.
Result 4.3 The median responses of subjects who believe their same (the
other) gender respond higher numbers is higher (lower) in the SG
round than in the MG round (one-tailed Sign-test p = 0:014 and p =
0:020 respectively).
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Now we can return to the question we left open at the end of Section 2.
We had observed that males with higher responses in the SG round reduced
their entries in the MG round. We mentioned that this was consistent with
the perception that females are better in the game. We also mentioned that
these males might have picked lower numbers in the MG round because they
expected level-0 females to choose lower numbers than level-0 males. The
analysis of Q1 and Q2 can shed light on this. Under the rst hypothesis,
males who changed behaviour should be those who believe that females are
better at the game. According to the second hypothesis, males who pick
higher entries in the SG round than in the MG one should answer to Q1
that men tend to pick higher numbers.
Males who believe that men respond higher numbers than females change
their behaviour between the SG and the MG rounds (Wilcoxon sign-rank,
p = 0:050). This would lend support to the hypothesis that males expected
level-0 females to choose lower numbers than level-0 males. However, we
nd no signicant opposite e¤ect for male subjects who believe that females
respond higher numbers. This begs the question of why changes in the
gender composition a¤ect only males who believe that their own gender
responds higher numbers.
On the other hand, the distribution of entries in the SG round picked
by males who believe that females are better at the game rst order sto-
chastically dominates the distribution of responses of males who believe the
opposite (Kolmogrow-Smirnov, p = 0:040). Recall that we observed that
males with higher responses in the SG round decrease their entries when
playing the MG round. The combination of these two observations implies
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that males who decrease their answers when playing the MG round are more
likely to believe that females are better in the game. The change in the me-
dian response across the two rounds for males who respond that females
are better at the game is in line with this explanation: The median is 28
in the MG round and 33 in the SG round. All this lends support to the
hypothesis that men increase their cognitive e¤ort in mixed gender groups
because they believe that females are relatively more sophisticated. Unfor-
tunately, our sample size does not allow for a more detailed analysis which
can discriminate further between these two hypotheses.
3.2 Beauty in the Classroom
3.2.1 Design and hypotheses
Let us present the results from a set of classroom experiments that we ran at
the University of Edinburgh between 2005 and 2010. This study allows us to
establish the robustness of Result 1 and to explore the existence of di¤eren-
tial responses to nancial incentives by gender. Participants were six cohorts
of undergraduate students taking an Intermediate Microeconomics course.
As part of the course, students had to ll an online problem set containing
several game-theoretic questions implemented via the website Games and
behaviour14. Cohorts ranged between 116 and 170 students. Completing
the problem set was compulsory. Students had no previous instruction in
game theory. They had a diverse background both by nationality and ma-
14Developed by Ariel Rubinstein and Eli Zvuluny. Available at
http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/.
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jor of study. In total, 792 students took part, 39.4% of them were female.15
Although we do not have information about the exact gender composition
of each cohort, they mirrored this proportion fairly consistently.
In one of the questions in the problem set, students had to guess two-
thirds of the average of all responses of students in the class.16 In the
2007, 2008 and 2010 cohorts (n=401), a prize of £ 10 (about 12 euros) was
given to the student who made the best guess. If there were more than one
winner, the prize was divided. We call this the Prize treatment. The No
prize treatment corresponds to the other three cohorts (n=391) in which no
money was awarded to the winner. The instructor did not mention in class
that the name of the winner(s) was to be announced publicly. So for the No
prize treatment, such non-monetary reward was not made explicit.17
There are clear di¤erences between this study and the gender neutral
part of the lab experiment presented in previous sections. The lab study was
within subjects; monetary incentives were bigger and groups were smaller.
The rst (non-incentivised) phase of the lab study was meant to familiarise
subjects with the design, whereas in the classroom study the absence of
nancial incentives was a full treatment. And perhaps more importantly,
students in the classroom study could potentially communicate with each
15When retrieving the data from the website, we were provided rst with the list of
participantsnames but without their responses in order to ensure anonimity. We then
assigned gender to these names and returned the list. We then received the data associ-
ating responses to the gender of the responder.
16The exact phrasing was: "Each of you (the students in this course) have to choose an
integer between 0 and 100 in order to guess 2/3 of the average of the responses given by
all students in the course. Each student who guesses 2/3 of the average of all responses
rounded up to the nearest integer, will receive a prize to be announced by your teacher
(or alternatively will have the satisfaction of being right!)." This phrasing was identical in
the two treatments.
17This does not rule out that students could seek prestige or status among their peers.
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other or look up for solutions elsewhere. We thus lose control over some
important elements of the experiment. The advantage is that we can go
beyond the lab and enhance the external validity of Result 1.
In addition, this experiment allows us to study gender di¤erences in the
response to enhanced monetary incentives because, unlike in the lab study,
we are comparing only rst responses. The model by Alaoui and Penta
(2016) suggests that participants in the Prize cohorts should display engage
in more rounds of reasoning, but it remains silent on the existence of di¤er-
ential responses by gender. Results in Fryer at al. (2008) suggest that we
should expect men to react more strongly than women to the presence of the
monetary reward. But their study is not directly comparable to ours since
they use a general knowledge test instead of a strategic interaction. Finally,
stronger monetary incentives might induce di¤erential responses by gender
depending on its perceived gender-bias (Guenther et al. 2010; Shurchkov,
2012). If the game is perceived to be female-biased, as responses to the
questionnaire in the lab study seem to suggest, higher nancial incentives
should inducing females to exert more competitive e¤ort.
3.2.2 Results
Table 8 reports the aggregate results by gender in the two treatments.
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Mean Median Std dev Obs.
Male, No prize 37.6 35 23.9 243
Female, No prize 41.9 42 23.3 148
Male, Prize 35.7 33 22.7 237
Female, Prize 36.4 34 23.5 164
Table 8: Aggregate Results by Gender and Treatment.
The table suggests that, as in the laboratory study, males choose lower
entries than females when monetary incentives are absent, and that gender
di¤erences vanish when a prize is awarded. Indeed, the distributions of
responses across genders di¤er in the No prize treatment (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0:049; Median test, p = 0:036), and do not di¤er in the Prize treatment
(Mann-Whitney, p = 0:688; Median test, p = 0:316).
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Figure 7: Cumulative Distributions of Responses by Gender and Treatment.
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Figure 7 breaks down the cumulative distributions of responses by gender
across treatments (upper panels) and by treatments across genders (lower
panels). The cumulative distributions of responses in the No prize treatment
are depicted with dashed lines. The lower left panel shows the cumulative
distributions of male and female responses under the No prize treatment.
The Davidson-Duclos test concludes that the distribution of female responses
rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of male responses (see
third column of Table A3 in Appendix A). On the other hand, the lower
right panel shows virtually no gender di¤erences in the cumulative distri-
butions of responses in the Prize cohorts. We thus corroborate Result 1:
When nancial incentives are absent, females play according to less rounds
of reasoning than males, but when nancial incentives are present, gender
di¤erences are no longer signicant.
The results also show that female participants react more strongly to
monetary incentives than males, to the extent that gender di¤erences van-
ish when a monetary prize is at stake. Table 8 and the upper panels of Figure
7 show that females change their behaviour when there is a monetary prize
whereas malesresponses do not di¤er much across the two treatments. The
distributions of femalesresponses di¤er across treatments (Mann-Whitney,
p = 0:026; Median test, p = 0:054), but the distributions of malesresponses
do not. (Mann-Whitney, p = 0:334; Median test, p = 0:154). In addition,
the upper right panel shows that the distribution of female responses under
No prize rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of female re-
sponses in the Prize treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov, p = 0:031); whereas
dominance for males is unclear. The Davidson-Duclos test corroborates this
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(see Table A3 in Appendix A).
Result 5 Females display deeper strategic reasoning in the Prize treatment
than in the No prize treatment. Males do not respond to the presence
of a monetary incentive.
That females respond signicantly to monetary incentives runs against
the results in Fryer et al. (2008). It also suggests that the conclusion of
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) whereby monetary incentives have a small
e¤ect in experimental games might not necessarily apply to female popu-
lations. If nancial incentives constitute a cue indicating that the beauty
contest is a competitive interaction, it is to be expected that females react
to this contextual information more strongly than men (Croson and Gneezy,
2009).
On the other hand, the fact that males do not react to the presence of a
monetary prize also suggests that males may consider that a non-monetary
prize is at stake in the No prize treatment. This is consistent with males
in the No prize treatment displaying similar depth of strategic reasoning to
females in the Prize treatment. But since economic incentives did not a¤ect
their strategic e¤ort, it might be the case that males either regarded the
prize as of relatively low value or that the monetary incentive crowded out
any psychological reward.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the existence and endogeneity of gender di¤er-
ences in observed strategic reasoning. We used the beauty contest game
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as experimental design. We made no attempt to speculate on where the
di¤erences we observed come from.
We reported results from two studies. The rst study was a labora-
tory experiment where we manipulated monetary incentives, gender salience
and gender composition. We found that the gender di¤erences in observed
depth of reasoning that emerge in zero-stakes rounds disappear when -
nancial incentives are introduced. Gender di¤erences reappear when gender
and stereotypes are made salient. Females react very strongly to priming by
lowering their responses. Males react less strongly and in the opposite direc-
tion. The e¤ect of changes in the gender composition of the group is weak
and only applies to a subset of males, who seem to engage in more rounds
of reasoning in mixed gender groups compared to single gender groups.
In the guessing game, gender salience may trigger opposed stereotypes
relating to potential performance of females. On the one hand, it may
trigger negative stereotypes relating to the mathematical skills of females.
On the other hand, gender salience may trigger positive stereotypes about
females advantage in understanding opponents. A caveat of our design is
that it does not allow us to isolate these two forces, although our results
suggest the latter dominates. This might be due to the complexity of the
calculation involved in the beauty contest being relatively small compared
to the di¢ culty of mentalising it requires. Responses to a questionnaire we
administered to our participants lend support to this interpretation. Females
who react to gender priming are those who believe that females are better in
the game. In addition, males who answer that females are better at the game
choose higher entries when gender is salient, suggesting that they might be
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experiencing stereotype threat.
The second study was a large classroom experiment. Its main result is
that females engage in more rounds of reasoning when a nancial reward
is introduced whereas men do not. Note that we only study the e¤ect of
introducing economic incentives. Given the size of the cohorts and the value
of the prize, this probably had a purely cuing e¤ect. Further research might
explore the e¤ects of changes from low, but positive, to higher monetary
incentives on strategic sophistication.
Our rst remark is that we observe gender di¤erences only when we
manipulate monetary incentives and priming. This might explain why there
are so few studies reporting gender di¤erences (or the lack of) in strategic
interactions. In incentivised experiments, gender di¤erences might arise only
if gender is made salient. We are aware that gender di¤erences can emerge
spuriously when subjectscharacteristics correlate with gender, e.g. major
of study.18 Our subject pool in the lab study was relatively homogeneous
so we are relatively free from this problem.
In addition, the present paper is one of the few where women are ob-
served to outperform men and where gender salience is benecial to female
performance. One exception is Shurchkov (2012), who obtains that women
surpass men in a low-pressure verbal task. Our result on priming is also
in sharp contrast with the literature on the e¤ect of gender information on
performance in mathematical tests. Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000) nd that
simply placing a woman in a room with men decreases her test performance.
Danaher and Crandall (2008) nd that just marking ones gender after an
18We thank Colin Camerer for pointing this out.
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advanced placement calculus test rather than before the test, led to a 33%
reduction in the performance gender-gap. Our results suggest that gender
salience in strategic interactions may lead to increases in depth of reasoning
in females. Since gender priming seems to be detrimental for males, selective
gender salience might be even a more e¤ective intervention.
Our nal remark refers to the portability of our results. The beauty
contest is a relatively complex game with a big strategy space. Hence, it
is to be expected that players use simple rules of play, even non-strategic
ones (Fragiadakis et al., 2013). In fact, level-k theories can be interpreted as
rules of thumb grounded on "an instinctive reaction to the game" (Crawford
et al., 2013). These rules might change with how instructions are laid out
(Georganas et al., 2015) and with the strategy space (Benhabib et al., 2014).
It is natural to expect simple rules of play to be sensitive to individual
characteristics and gender salience. Further research should address whether
the gender di¤erences in strategic behaviour that we uncover in the guessing
game remain in other games where standard equilibrium predictions are
more transparent and where subjects may be less prone to resort to simple
heuristics.
Maria Cubel. Brunel University, University of Barcelona and IEB.
Santiago Sanchez-Pages. Kings College London and University of Barcelona.
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Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures
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Figure A1: Moves of Participants in the SG-MG Order of the Priming Treatment.
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Figure A2: Cumulative Distributions of Responses by Gender to Phase 1 Rounds.
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No incentives No priming MG Priming MG Priming SG
1 -0.3590 -0.5876 1.1679 0.8360
6 0.0000 1.1424 1.4564 1.1424
10 0.7027 -0.4862 1.5247 1.8045
15 0.2959 -1.4846 2.1139** 2.1552**
22 -0.3697 -1.2388 2.9304*** 2.7395***
33 -0.5036 1.1395 1.5524 1.1395
44 -2.4640*** -0.5485 1.4564 2.2548**
50 -1.1939 -1.4941 0.8203 2.5082***
67 -1.3783 -0.5876 0.0000 2.3180**
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of female
(male) responses is higher than for the other sex.
Table A1: Female-male DD Test t-statistics per Round of the Lab Study.
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No priming vs Priming
Males
No priming vs Priming
Females
MG vs SG
Males
MG vs SG
Females
1 0.3997 -1.3367 0.0000 0.3444
6 0.4696 -0.5091 -0.5308 -0.2135
10 2.0239** -1.3829 0.6414 0.3619
15 1.8956* -1.4839 0.3783 0.3367
22 1.2168 -2.4439*** 0.1686 0.3502
33 1.2168 -2.1491** 0.0000 0.4106
44 0.5091 -1.3620 0.2135 -0.6037
50 1.7186* -0.7210 0.7095 -1.0366
67 0.2455 -0.3997 1.1679 -1.4342
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of the rst
(second) element in the comparison is higher than the other.
Table A2: DD Test t-statistics for Round Comparisons in the Lab Study.
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No prize vs Prize
Males
No prize vs Prize
Females
Males vs Females
No prize
Males vs Females
Prize
1 -1.2772 3.1908*** -3.1385*** 1.7107*
6 -0.9446 2.3097** -2.3406*** 1.0942
10 -0.7632 1.8925* -1.9509* 0.2484
15 0.8216 2.3290*** -1.7346* 0.1031
22 0.4790 1.7681* -1.6279 -0.1163
33 1.4628 1.4961 -1.4248 -1.1050
44 0.7612 1.8036* -2.0286** -0.7584
50 0.1599 2.0818** -1.9510* 0.1594
67 1.0358 0.6773 -0.3669 -0.5475
Positive (negative) t-statistics indicate that the accumulated frequency of the rst (second)
element in the comparison is higher than the other.
Table A3: Davidson-Duclos (DD) Test t-statistics for the Classroom Study.
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